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“Serémos como el Che”: Chilean elenos, Bolivia and the cause of 
Latinoamericanismo, 1967-1970 
 
Tanya Harmer, LSE 
 
On 19 July 1970, 67 guerrillas stormed a small US-mining enclave in Teoponte, 
Bolivia, taking 2 hostages and sinking the company’s dredger. Having failed to seize 
the gold the mine produced (it had been transferred to La Paz the previous day), they 
retreated into the mountains, dense with foliage and mosquitos. Their aim was to trek 
across Bolivia’s northeast and establish a guerrilla camp in the Alto Beni region, 
mobilise support from the local population and from there, somehow, join up with un-
specified guerrilla forces from neighbouring countries that would span out throughout 
Latin America. It was an astonishingly ambitious plan. Yet, for the insurgents, this 
was a logical continuation of Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s revolutionary project in 
Bolivia, cut short when he had been killed in October 1967. Like Che’s venture, the 
insurgency was nevertheless a disaster. Only 8 guerrillas survived, emerging from the 
jungle after being given an amnesty, tired and emaciated. It was a desperate end to 
almost three years of planning since Guevara’s death. Preparations for the insurgency 
had also been mired in incompetence and tragedy that left many more dead or 
disillusioned.1  
All of which begs the question as to why it is worth studying. This article 
argues that it is significant for two reasons. First, the history of the insurgency is an 
example of revolutionary internationalism during the guerrilla decade of the 1960s. It 
provides insight into the recruitment and logistical framework for such ventures: why 
people joined, how internationalist insurgencies were instigated, managed and 
executed. In this respect, the insurgency’s trajectory and participants are indicative. 
Of the 67 guerrillas at Teoponte, 53 were Bolivians, 8 were Chileans and 2 came from 
Argentina. The remaining four were from Brazil, Peru, Colombia and the United 
States. Many more Chileans provided rear-guard support for the organisation. 
Although the Cubans withdrew support (and guerrillas) for the insurgency in mid-
1969, they had also initially been the principal orchestrators of this revolutionary 
project and had provided extensive training, money and logistical support. Uruguay’s 
Tupamaros had then offered essential funding, via Chile, in April 1970 after the 
Cubans had suspended their collaboration.2  
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, the origins and goals of this 
insurgency make it one of the most concrete and conscious efforts during the late 20th 
century to instigate an explicitly “Latin American” revolution aiming to bring 
imperialism to its knees around the world. Reference points were historically and 
geographically far away rather than contemporary or local. And in this respect it 
epitomizes what Aldo Marchesi has called the “continentalization and globalization” 
of revolutionary projects in the late 1960s, encouraged by Cuba and fuelled by 
Guevara’s guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia.3 Despite the guerrilla organisation’s                                                         
1 For a full account of the Teoponte insurgency see Gustavo Rodríguez Ostria, Sin tiempo para las 
palabras: Teoponte, la otra guerrilla guevarista en Bolivia (Cochabamba, Bolivia: Grupo Editorial 
Kipus, 2006). 
2 Interview with Félix Huerta, 20 April 2010, Santiago, Chile; Ibid., 266–67, 617–67. 
3 Alberto Aldo Marchesi, “Geographies of Armed Protest: Transnational Cold War, Latin Americanism 
and the New Left in the Southern Cone (1964-1976)” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2013), 135–
36, 172. 
misleading name that Guevara had given it in March 1967 - the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN) – its goals were regional and global. As one Chilean who participated 
in the insurgency wrote to his parents before departing for the mountains, 
“Somos…parte de la gran familia Latinoamericana…Algún día alcanzaremos 
nuestros objetivos para así lograr una sola Patria. ‘La gran Patria Latinoamericana’”.4 
But what did this mean? What led individuals to pursue a transnational Latin 
Americanist goal? And with what consequences? Ultimately, this article argues that 
the Latin American revolution that ELN recruits fought and died for was ephemeral, 
simplistic and imagined. It was not a completely new idea; Latin Americanist projects 
in various guises have been popular at different moments for two centuries. But it was 
a potent articulation of it. Promoted by Cuba and embodied by Che Guevara, it 
became particularly powerful in the late 1960s, inspiring people to sacrifice their lives 
for its cause. In the case of the ELN in Bolivia, it also provided legitimacy and 
grandeur for what was otherwise precarious, ad-hoc and only vaguely linked to 
established parties. Indeed, transnational collaboration together with regional and 
global aspirations made the insurgency seem far more significant that it might 
otherwise have been. Although one eleno – as ELN recruits were known – 
acknowledged that in hindsight it was “una locura”, the notion of Cuba’s Revolution 
extending to the rest of Latin America seemed very real at the time; part of the 
“espíritu de la epoca”.5  
This epoch was relatively short. When the guerrillas launched their doomed 
insurgency at Teoponte, the ELN’s star – and the idea of a Latin American revolution 
– was already fading. To some extent this had to do with disillusionment and defeats 
over the previous two years. But it also speaks to the brevity of the Latin Americanist 
project’s heyday. True, the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR), which 
brought far Left groups from Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia together from 
1972 sustained the idea of a regional revolution. It also built on relationships and 
networks made precisely during the ELN years. Yet it was largely defensive, and 
unsupported by the people who had initially promulgated the idea: the Cubans.6 
Indeed, from mid-1969 onwards, instead of promoting the idea of a Latin American 
revolution, Havana’s leaders downgraded their emphasis on armed revolution and 
turned to different individual national projects, among them nationalist military 
governments in Panama, Peru and Bolivia and Chile’s Unidad Popular. Specificity 
and peculiarity of different countries’ experiences became significant.7 The history of 
the road to Teoponte is therefore an intriguing story of a project stradling the rise and 
fall of a regional, Latin Americanist revolutionary ideal.  
It is impossible to provide a detailed account of the ELN, its make up, 
trajectory and insurgency here. Instead, to grapple with its Latin Americanist 
character, this article focuses on Chilean elenos and examines how, when and why 
recruits signed up. It then moves on to examine the ELN’s aims and conceptual 
framework. Finally, it looks at the unravelling of the ideas that underpinned the 
ELN’s project, dealing specifically with the reasons why the Cubans turned away 
from the project, what this meant for the insurgency and why many of the Chileans                                                         
4 Tirso Montiel, 17 June 1970, as quoted in Cristián Pérez, “El ejército del Che y los chilenos que 
continuaron su lucha”, Estudios Públicos 89 (2003), 244. 
5 Interview with Sonia Daza Sepulveda, 18 March 2013, Mexico City.   
6 A. Marchesi, “Geographies of Armed Protest”, 239–43; John Dinges, The Condor Years: How 
Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004), 56. 
7 Tanya Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions?: Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change 
in Latin America, 1967-1975”, Journal of Latin American Studies 45:1 (2013). 




In January 1968, news reached Santiago that the three Cuban survivors of Che 
Guevara’s guerrilla column – known by their pseudonyms as Pombo, Benigno and 
Urbano – were escaping across the Andes to Chile. Manuel Cabieses, the editor of the 
far Left magazine, Punto Final, was the first to be notified. As he later explained, his 
magazine was  “un especie de consulado cubano” in the absence of formal diplomatic 
relations; “no tenía que ser muy astuto para sospechar que había una relación”.8 
Having heard the news, Cabieses contacted the journalist and Chilean Socialist, Elmo 
Catalán, who in turn communicated the news to Havana.9 
It is unclear when exactly Catalán began collaborating with Cuba but by 1967 
he was regarded as “un hombre del aparato cubano”, skilled in intelligence work and 
cryptography. He had probably first visited Cuba in 1962, where he received training, 
and had subsequently travelled to the island various times. There are also reports that 
he met Che Guevara in Prague and discussed how to help support his Bolivian 
operation from Chile. Whether true or not, he had certainly undertaken secret 
missions for the Cubans and in 1966-7 he recruited Chilean volunteers to support the 
insurgency, sending some of them to Havana for training.10  
In 1967, as well as working for the Cubans, Catalán was an assistant to the 
Socialist Party Senator, Carlos Altamirano, and Director of Cobre, the Confederación 
de Trabajadores del Cobre’s newspaper. Unlike many of the middle class students 
who would later try to emulate Che Guevara, he came from a poor family in the north 
of Chile and had worked in nitrate mines and the construction industry. As he would 
reflect, “Sufrí en carne propia…la pobreza y la explotación. El trabajo como peón en 
la pampa salitrera, en el cobre o en la construcción…me impactó y sensibilizó 
profundamente”.11 In the 1950s he had been the first of his family attend university 
and had been a student leader at the University of Chile, graduating with a degree in 
journalism. Writing for the Communist Party’s newspaper, El Siglo, and the Socialist 
Party’s newspaper, Las Noticias de Última Hora, he had reported the massacre of 
workers at El Salvador mine in 1966. He had also been part of Salvador Allende’s 
press team during the presidential election in 1964 and was one of many on the Left 
deeply frustrated when Allende lost. The propaganda campaign against the Left in 
1964 and the El Salvador massacre had a profound impact on him, hardening his 
politics and leading him to reject constitutional possibilities for radical change. “Por 
mucho que hable de revolución, de liberación o de amor por el pueblo”, he would 
write, “no pasará de ser esclavo consciente del sistema, cómplice de la opresión o, en 
muchos casos, gendarme de sus propios hermanos si no toma el único camino honesto 
                                                        
8 Interviews with Manuel Cabieses, 25 March 2010; and Luis Fernández Oña, 6 April 2010, Santiago 
Chile.  The fact that Punto Final’s offices were in the same building as Prensa Latina added to its 
significance. See also Pedro Martínez Pírez in Luis Suárez Salazar and Dirk Kruijt, eds., La Revolución 
Cubana en Nuestra América: El internacionalismo anónimo (Havana: Ruth Casa Editorial, 2015), 42. 
9 José Bodes, En la senda del Che: biografía de Elmo Catalán (Havana: Prensa Latina, 2009), 56; G. 
Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 45. 
10 Interview with Luis Fernández Oña, 6 April 2010; off the record interview with ex-Eleno, 27 March 
2010; G. Rodríguez Ostria, Sin tiempo para las palabras, 74–79; J. Bodes, En la senda del Che, 128; 
Félix Huerta and Jaime Chávez, El trabajo es vivir. Conversaciones de Félix Huerta con Jaime Chávez 
(Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Rubén Darío, 2011), 70. 
11 “Carta de despedida de Elmo Catalán,” 19 April 1970 in J. Bodes, En la senda del Che, 16, 113–14. 
que existe para independizar nuestros países: el de la lucha armada hasta las últimas 
consecuencias.”12  
When it came to this conviction and his support for Guevara’s Bolivia 
insurgency, Catalán does not seem to have used specific criteria to select recruits. 
Most were Socialists, like him, attracted to armed revolution but unconvinced of its 
prospects in Chile. Beyond this they came from across Chilean society and appear to 
have been chosen because he knew them through his work as a journalist or for the 
Socialist Party. It was not what recruits knew that was important, but who they knew 
and whether they could be trusted for clandestine work that was important. They were 
also not from the far Left party, the MIR, which embraced armed revolution but 
which at the time focused on Chile’s national context and had few contacts with the 
Cubans. As one eleno remembered, it was a very close-knit group made up of friends 
rather than a formal section of a political party. 13  
Félix Huerta, an active Socialist Party militant and fifth year medical student, 
who Catalán had come across during student protests, was approached by his 
psychiatry professor at the University of Chile in mid-1967. A few months before 
Guevara’s death, he was asked simply if he wanted to go to Bolivia “a combatir” and 
train as a guerrilla. Having said yes, he was put in contact with Catalán.14 Catalán also 
recruited the Socialist militant brothers Fernando and Carlos Gomez, respectively an 
ex-military conscript and president of the miner’s union at El Salvador.15 In 1966, 
Fernando was one of those sent to Cuba for guerrilla training.16 Around the same 
time, having heard Che Guevara was in Bolivia, Tirso Montiel, an ex-Carabinero and 
Socialist militant had also left for Cuba in an effort to join him.17 Meanwhile, 
Cabieses, who had previously received Cuban training in intelligence, offered 
Catalán’s group informal advice on security.18 But, for the time being, the Chileans 
working with Catalán hoping to support Che Guevara in Bolivia did very little.19 
The Chilean support network led by Elmo Catalán was part of Havana’s 
broader effort to establish a network of Latin American collaborators. The Cubans 
never considered Chile itself as suitable for guerrilla insurgency. Its geography 
(between the Andes and the Pacific) together with its strong constitutionalist Left 
undermined the potential for armed revolution. Instead, Cuba’s contacts were with 
Chile’s established left-wing parties, and in particular the Left’s presidential candidate 
between 1952 and 1970: Salvador Allende. When Chileans volunteered to take part in 
armed revolution, the Cubans meanwhile pointed them elsewhere. As Fidel explained 
to a Chilean journalist attending the inaugural conference of the regional 
Organización Latinoamericano de Solidaridad  (OLAS) in July-August 1967, “if you 
want to be involved in guerrilla warfare there are conflicts on your doorstep, there in 
Bolivia…When the conditions do not exist in one country, you must support those 
who have them.”20 And, of course, the establishment of a Chilean support network 
was precisely for this purpose. As the CIA noted in early 1968, “Even in those                                                         
12 Ibid., 114. 
13 Interview with Celsa Parrau, 1 April 2010, Santiago, Chile. 
14 Interview with Félix Huerta and Luis Fernández Oña, 23 March 2010; J. Bodes, En la senda del Che, 
59. 
15 J. Bodes, En la senda del Che, 88. 
16 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 61. 
17 Ibid., 422. 
18 Interview with Manuel Cabieses. 
19 Interview with Félix Huerta and Luis Fernández Oña. 
20 Aldo Marchesi, “Revolution Beyond the Sierra Maestra: The Tupamaros and the Development of a 
Repertoire of Dissent in the Southern Cone”, The Americas 70:3 (2014). 
countries where there is no significant insurgency under way, the Cubans have been 
developing a support mechanism while they wait for a suitable opportunity and 
adequate assets.”21 
The news that Cuban survivors of his column were escaping Bolivia after Che 
Guevara’s death provided the opportunity to use these assets. Having alerted the 
Cubans, Catalán sent Félix Huerta to Bolivia to make contact with the guerrillas and 
get details of their escape plans. He then coordinated efforts with other Chilean left-
wing leaders and with the Cubans to meet the guerrillas at their designated entry point 
and protect them from Chile’s security services.22  
One of those who joined Elmo Catalán’s team at this point was Beatriz 
Allende, Salvador Allende’s daughter. An admirer of the Cuban Revolution, and a 
Socialist, she had been deeply impacted by the news of Che Guevara’s death and by 
the figure of “Tania”, the Argentine-East German revolutionary Haydée Tamara 
Bunke, who had fought and died in Bolivia with Che.23 Arriving in Cuba with her 
father in late 1967, she had asked the Cubans for guerrilla training. The Cubans were 
reluctant to train her, fearing the implications this could have for her father’s political 
standing in Chile. However, she was offered “tiros, disparos”, at a firing range in 
Havana. This was rudimentary training, the Cuban intelligence official who 
coordinated it explained, but it helped temporarily satisfy her desire for armed 
revolution.24  
A month later, apparently by coincidence, this same official – Luis Fernández 
Oña or “Demid” as he was known – was clandestinely in Santiago when news of the 
Cuban survivors of Che’s column reached Santiago. Knowing she was desperate to 
collaborate with Cuba’s revolutionary ventures in Latin America, he introduced 
Beatriz to Elmo Catalán, who recruited her immediately. As Juan Carretero, a Cuban 
intelligence officer directing Bolivian operations remembered, she would go on to 
play “un papel muy destacado” in preparations for the ELN’s subsequent insurgency 
and demonstrated “una lealtad al legado del Che”.25 “Era Latinoamericana, su 
formación, su pensamiento era ‘Nuestra Latinoamérica’”, another Cuban intelligence 
officer remembered.26 In addition to Beatriz, Catalán also recruited a young Socialist 
lawyer, Arnoldo Camú, and his wife, Celsa Parrau. Underscoring the importance of 
close personal connections between elenos is the fact that Beatriz had met them a 
couple of months before at the Bolshevik Revolution’s 50th anniversary celebrations 
in Moscow. As Celsa remembered, conversations in the Soviet Union, “se centró 
fundamentalmente en lo que estaba pasando en Cuba” and how to follow in Che’s                                                         
21 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Special Report. Cuban Subversive Activities in Latin America: 
1959-1968,” February 16, 1968, http-
//www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000109057. Establishing 
Chilean support for revolutionary activities in Bolivia was not the only network that the Cubans 
established. As the CIA noted with regards to Colombian support for Venezuelan guerrillas in 1966 
“Cuba has been able to bring about limited international cooperation of national movements and parties 
in some areas. This has helped to create or strengthen infrastructures upon which future revolutionary 
activities may be built, by making it easier to channel funds, move agents and leaders, transmit 
communications, and obtain false documents.”  
22 Interview with Luis Fernández Oña, 6 April 2010; G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 46–53; F. Huerta 
and J. Chávez, El trabajo es vivir, 200–201. 
23 Interview with Huerta and Oña. Ulises Estrada, Tania: Undercover in Bolivia with Che Guevara 
(Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2005). 
24 Interview with Huerta and Oña; Interview with Oña, 6 April 2010.  
25 Interview with Juan Carretero, 18 April 2011, Havana, Cuba.  
26 Interview with Ulises Estrada, 19 April 2011, Havana Cuba. 
footsteps.27 Catalán and the Cuban survivors escape to Chile now provided the 
answer. 
As it turned out, however, efforts launched by Catalán to meet the Cubans 
were a fiasco. Despite weeks of searching the Andes, his team – including Félix 
Huerta and Beatriz – failed to make contact and the Cubans were left with no choice 
but to hand themselves into the local police and ask for asylum. Thanks to Chilean 
left-wing mobilisation, together with Salvador Allende’s role in securing their release, 
the Cuban survivors were nevertheless allowed to return to Cuba.28 And yet their 
escape provided the catalyst – the entry point – for the establishment of a Chilean 
branch of the ELN, coordinated by Elmo Catalán, Beatriz Allende and Arnoldo 
Camú. 
The principal purpose of this ELN branch was to provide a rear-guard for a 
future guerrilla insurgency. Immediately after Che Guevara’s death, the survivors of 
his column had pledged to fulfil his mission and had designated the Bolivian among 
them, Guido Álvado “Inti” Peredo, to lead the operation. With their infrastructure in 
tatters, they had decided to retreat, regroup and recruit others before launching a new 
insurgency. In late 1967 and early 1968, Cuba’s leaders had simultaneously begun 
helping. Surviving members of the ELN’s urban underground were meanwhile 
arriving in Cuba to ask for assistance. Bolivians who had been trained and planning to 
join Che before he died were also stuck on the island and new volunteers arrived in 
Havana wanting to sign up for a new revolutionary campaign. Cuba’s intelligence 
team responsible for Latin American operations – the Viceministerio Technico at the 
Ministerio del Interior headed by Manuel Piñeiro – therefore began coordinating 
preparations.29  
First, they had to help surviving ELN members escape to Havana via Chile. 
And in this respect the Chilean elenos played an important role acquiring safe houses 
and recruiting an underground network for people and supplies transiting between 
Bolivia and Cuba.30 Meetings to coordinate such ventures were “ad hoc” and “muy 
informal”, Celsa remembered. Mostly, they took place in each other’s houses or in a 
safe house they acquired, looked after by “Dina”, one of the Allende family maids 
Beatriz had recruited.31 As a lawyer for trade unions and the banking sector, Arnoldo 
Camú also had contacts that were instrumental in finding safe houses and cover 
stories.32 Meanwhile, Beatriz Allende – a recent medical graduate – enlisted doctors 
and professors of medicine, who helped by donating their homes and money, even if 
they did not always know what for. Her former supervisor at the University of Chile, 
for example, would recall Beatriz asked for money for a  “casa de huérfanos…en 
mala situación económica”, only to discover later that the “huerfanitos” he donated 
money to were elenos. 33  
                                                        
27 Interview with Parrau.  
28 Interview with Oña, 6 April 2010; G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 53.  
29 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 23–25. 
30 Interviews with Huerta, 23 March and 20 April 2010 and off the record interview with ex-Eleno, 27 
March 2010; Ibid., 80–82, 137–46.  
31 Interviews with Parrau and Huerta. Beatriz’s cousin, Ana Maria Bussi, lived in the Allende 
household during the late 1960s and remembers her having constant meetings in her room to the point 
that she worried about bumping into people in the house in the middle of the night. Interview with Ana 
Maria Bussi, 9 April 2010, Santiago, Chile. 
32 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 80. 
33 Email correspondence with Arturo Jirón Vargas, 30 April 2013; interview with Manuel Ipinza, 22 
July 2013, Santiago, Chile.   
With this underground network growing, the elenos planned operations along 
the Chilean-Bolivian frontier to map out crossings to Bolivia. Then, in May 1968, 
while students were out on the streets in Paris carrying Che Guevara flags, the 
Chilean elenos launched their first major operation since the Cuban survivors had 
arrived in Chile to rescue Inti Peredo from Bolivia. It was a difficult operation, 
involving crossing the Andes by foot. Fernando Gomez, chosen by the Cubans and 
Catalán to guide Inti across the border, later had to have his frostbitten toes 
amputated.34 And yet, by rescuing the ELN’s leader, by offering him refuge in Chile 
before safe transit to Cuba, the elenos ensured preparations for a new guerrilla 
insurgency could begin in earnest. While in Chile, prior to departing for Havana to 
meet other recruits and begin training, Inti also published what became the ELN’s 
new manifesto.35 Although it is hard to know for certain, there is general consensus 
that Elmo Catalán wrote or at least helped draft it – itself, further confirmation of the 
internationalist Chilean contribution to the new Bolivian insurgency.36 “Volveremos a 
la montaña”, as the manifesto was called, had a simple yet powerful message: 
Revolution had not ended with Che Guevara’s death; it had only just begun.37  
 
“…los herederos del Che”  
 
“Volveremos a la montaña” is revealing for what it tells us about the ELN’s 
conceptual framework. Together with former elenos’ testimonies, published 
documents pertaining to the organisation and reporting from the time it helps us piece 
together the ideas and motives that underpinned the insurgency. But to understand the 
ELN’s ideas and language, they have to be read in context.  
First, Che Guevara’s Bolivian legacy is important. As Elmo Catalán would 
remember, “Me dolió profundamente no combatir al lado del Che en Bolivia.” 
Looking back, he explained to his family, “busqué la oportunidad a veces hasta con 
desesperación” to go to Bolivia.38 Or as another eleno put it, “la muerte del Ché fue 
un remezón a la conciencia boliviana y a la de Latinoamérica.”39 One Chilean 
internationalist who joined a guerrilla insurgency in Venezuela after Guevara’s death 
similarly pointed to Che as an inspiration, arguing that all revolutionaries had to adopt 
his “actitud moral y ética”.40 In the weeks after the Argentine revolutionary’s death 
was announced, demonstrations and protests erupted in Chile to condemn his 
“asesinato”. Students flew flags at half-mast, and the Chilean Senate held a two-hour 
vigil.41 The Chilean Socialist Party’s Congress, meeting in Chillán in November 
                                                        
34 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 61–85; interviews with Parrau, Huerta and Oña; off the record 
interview with ex-Eleno; correspondence with Arturo Jirón. 
35 J. Bodes, En la senda del Che, 68–69. 
36 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 85, 166, 242, 318. 
37 Inti Peredo, “Volveremos a la montaña,” July 1968, online at: 
http://www.ruinasdigitales.com/cristianismoyrevolucion/cyrintiperedovolveremosalasmontaas99/  
38 “Carta de despedida de Elmo Catalán,” 114.  
39 F. Huerta and J. Chávez, El trabajo es vivir, 221. On the importance of “la figuera del Che,” see 
interview with Sonia Daza Sepulveda, 18 March 2013. Sonia Daza was a member of the ELN trained 
in Cuba in 1969 and due to go to Bolivia to work in the urban underground before she was pulled back 
from the operation. She is also a widow of one of the Chileans who died during the Teoponte 
insurgency.  
40 “Guerrillero chileno afirma: ‘Llegó la hora de combatir’”, Punto Final 88, 30 September 1969. 
41 “Salvador Allende vino a Cuba a ofrecer condolencias por la muerte del Chile: entrevista de 1967”, 
online at: http://www.lafogata.org/chile/a13.htm  
1967, also recognised armed struggle as inevitable and legitimate even if this had 
little concrete meaning for the party’s operations in Chile.42 
The Cubans encouraged these sentiments. From Havana, ten days after Che 
was captured, Fidel Castro paid homage to Guevara. Enemies could say his death 
represented the end of his ideas and of revolution but they were wrong, Fidel insisted. 
The revolution had never been conceived as something that could be achieved quickly 
and Che Guevara had known this. Now he was dead, others would follow in his 
footsteps: “¡milliones de manos, inspiradas en su ejemplo, se extenderán para 
empuñar las armas!” he proclaimed. Guevara’s death was described as “heroica y 
gloriosa” and his example was celebrated. “Si queremos expresar cómo aspiramos 
que sean nuestros combatientes revolucionarios, nuestros militantes, nuestros 
hombres”, Castro continued, “sin vacilación de ninguna índole: ¡Que sean como el 
Che!”43 That Che had pre-empted his own death in a widely publicised message to 
revolutionaries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, instructing his followers to 
continue his mission, added weight to Fidel’s message. “En cualquier lugar que nos 
sorprenda la muerte”, Guevara had written, “bienvenida sea, siempre que ése, nuestro 
grito de guerra, haya llegado a un oído receptivo y otra mano se tienda para empuñar 
nuestras armas”.44 
In the weeks that followed, Punto Final took up Guevara’s call. “Ante la 
muerte del heroico Comandante Ernesto Ché Guevara, las palabras están como de 
más. Ellas brotan a borbotones, atropellándose por describir los sentimientos que 
agitan al movimiento revolucionario latinoamericano, o se niegan a trazar el 
homenaje retórico adecuado. El Ché no forjó su personalidad revolucionaria…para 
que se le llore. El homenaje que merece ese gran capitán de América Latina es la 
imitación multiplicada de su ejemplo”.45  
For the elenos in 1968 seeking to imitate Che by continuing his insurgency in 
Bolivia, Bolivia itself – the country, its socio-economic context, its history and its 
people – was only vaguely important. The idea of “National Liberation” had far more 
to do with the common nomenclature that Cuban-inspired revolutionary groups 
adopted of the time, understood in terms of liberating countries from global 
imperialism and monopolistic capitalism by means of irregular warfare and socialist 
revolution.46 As the Bolivian historian Gustavo Rodríguez Ostria has argued, elenos 
tended to treat Bolivia itself as a “scenario vacio” and its population as passive 
recipients of a future insurgency. In the ELN’s communiqués and internal documents,                                                         
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Bolivia’s 1952 revolution, workers’ militias, central trade union - the Central Obrera 
Boliviana (COB) – were generally ignored. True, the ELN’s members spoke of 
fighting for Bolivia’s “libertad”, against “gorrilas”, and for socialism, conceived as 
freedom from capitalist exploitation and for a planned economy, industrialisation and 
free education. During Che Guevara’s campaign in Bolivia, the ELN’s “Comunicado 
No.1 al Pueblo Boliviano” had also referred to the need to “rescatar un país vendido 
en tajadas a los monopolios yanquis y elevar el nivel de vida de nuestro pueblo, cada 
día más hambreado”.47 “Volveremos a la montaña” meanwhile pointed to “la miseria, 
el hambre, la muerte” of the Bolivian people and the country’s miners who lived in 
“campamentos de concentración”. 48 But the ELN had scarce connection to Bolivian 
mass organisations, and its goals were never articulated in terms of seizing power in 
Bolivia.49 Speaking about the ELN in an interview with a Chilean journalist, Inti had 
even explicitly acknowledged “no es una organización hecha para Bolivia. Esta es la 
época de la revolución continental”.50 Chilean elenos meanwhile had few personal 
Bolivian connections. Even if some of them had visited the country prior to joining 
the ELN, most had never been. 
Indeed, as Inti indicated, Bolivia was instead considered a key piece in a much 
larger Latin American and global project; part of a continental revolution that – 
together with Vietnam – would bring “el imperialismo yanqui” to its knees. Although 
Che Guevara came to embody this idea, the Cubans had promoted it since 1959. As 
Manuel Piñeiro recalled, “ever since he wrote ‘History Will Absolve Me’ in 1953, 
Fidel…made clear that [the Cuban] revolution was seeking the liberation and 
integration of Latin America.”51 Citing José Martí’s concept of “Nuestra America”, 
Havana’s leaders insisted that Latin America was united by its encounter with 
Spanish and US imperialism; that patterns of foreign exploitation had imbued the 
region with similar economic, political, cultural and linguistic characteristics.52 These 
shared traits and experiences, Cuba’s revolutionary leaders argued, in turn demanded 
a unified response. “¿Podría concebirse esta nueva etapa de la emancipación de 
América como el cotejo de dos fuerzas locales luchando por el poder en un territorio 
dado?” Che Guevara mused in an article he wrote in the early 1960s that was printed 
in Cuba and Chile after his death: 
 
Evidentemente no, la lucha será a muerte entre todas las fuerzas populares con 
todas las armas de destrucción a su alcance; no dejarán consolidarse al poder 
revolucionario y, si alguno llegara a hacerlo, volverán a atacar, no lo 
reconocerán, tratarán de dividir las fuerzas revolucionaras, introducirán 
saboteadores de todo tipo, intentarán ahogar económicamente al nuevo Estado,                                                         
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aniquilarlo, en una palabra. Dado este panorama Americano, consideramos 
difícil que la victoria se logre en un país aislado. A la unión de las fuerzas 
represivas debe contestare con la unión de las fuerzas populares.53 
 
In fact, Che Guevara made his support for regional revolution extensively throughout 
the 1960s. For those like Beatriz Allende who attended the Primer congreso 
latinoamericano de juventudes in July 1960, for example, the message was loud and 
clear: “¡que la libertad sea conquistada en cada rincón de América!” Che had 
proclaimed.54 This appeal to Latin Americanismo on the part by Cuba’s revolutionary 
leaders was at least partly defensive. As one Soviet bloc ambassador in Havana 
observed, “According to the Cuban perspective, the Cuban Revolution will be 
exposed to the risk of being invaded by imperialism, unless the revolution is 
triumphant on the whole continent. Even when there are no prospects for a successful 
end to the armed struggle, the latter still deprives the USA of its opportunities to 
attack and invade Cuba.”55 
When imagining what a “continental” revolution would look like, the Cubans 
had summoned celebrated narratives of Latin America’s nineteenth century struggle 
for independence. In September 1960, in what became known as the First Declaration 
of Havana, Castro had responded to a meeting of the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) condemning Cuba by appealing to the island’s “familia latinoamericana”. 
Citing Latin America’s liberation heroes including Bolívar, San Martín, O’Higgins, 
Sucre and José Martí, he called for unified Latin American resistance to US 
exploitation.56 Two years later, in 1962, he had responded to the expulsion of Cuba 
from the OAS by expanding on this message:  
 
Con lo grande que fue la epopeya de la independencia de América Latina…a 
la generación de latinoamericanos de hoy les ha tocado una epopeya mayor y 
más decisiva todavía para la humanidad.  Porque aquella lucha fue para 
librarse del poder colonial español, de una España decadente, invadida por los 
ejércitos de Napoleón. Hoy les toca la lucha de liberación frente a la metrópoli 
imperial más poderosa del mundo, frente a la fuerza más importante del 
sistema imperialista mundial, y para prestarle a la humanidad un servicio 
todavía más grande del que le prestaron nuestros antepasados…El deber de 
todo revolucionario es hacer la revolución…57   
 
Che Guevara would call the Second Declaration the “expresión y concreción” of 
Latin America’s revolutionary potential. “América hoy es un volcán; no está en 
erupción, pero está conmovida por inmensos ruidos subterráneos”, he added, 
describing Castro’s declaration as the words to these subterranan sounds.58  
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Young Chileans inclined towards armed struggle were increasingly captivated 
by this conceptual framework and by news of guerrilla insurgencies from abroad. It 
didn’t seem to matter how big or successful armed insurgences were. As one eleno 
recalled, even the smallest had “un impacto”. “Leíamos mucho de todo lo que llegaba 
de afuera”, he reflected, “éramos como esponjas, absorbíamos todo.”59 Cuba 
promoted and celebrated armed revolution through its news agency, Prensa Latina, 
and through publications instructing guerrilla hopefuls how to launch their own 
insurgency. From Che Guevara’s Guerra de guerrillas, first published in Havana in 
1960, and re-issued with an introduction on “methods” that captured young Chilean 
militants’ attention in 1963, to Regis Debray’s Revolution in the Revolution? 
published by Cuba’s Casa de las Americas in January 1967, Havana aruged that a 
rural foco could ignite revolution across Latin America.60  
This call for revolution on a regional scale had become increasingly powerful 
in the second half of the 1960s as a result of two major conferences in Cuba. In 
January 1966, the Organización de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de Asia, África y 
América Latina (OSPAAAL) – or Tricontinental – held its inaugural conference in 
Havana. It was an enormous public undertaking celebrating revolutionary violence as 
a necessary and desirable response to US imperialism. Delegates proclaimed 
solidarity with “revolutionary movements of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Panama, 
Ecuador, and other countries of the Caribbean area and the southern part of the 
hemisphere.”61 Salvador Allende, a delegate to the conference also proposed the 
establishment of special Latin American solidarity organisation, OLAS, which met 
the following year at another conference in Havana. The new organisation gave 
concrete meaning to the idea of a Latin Americanist revolution, defining “solidarity” 
as support for “guerrilla warfare and revolutionary struggle in all the countries of 
Latin America.”62 
By the late-1960s, global events also attracted Latin American revolutionaries’ 
attention and added weight to this internationalist ideal. The United States’ war in 
Vietnam, in particular, dominated the Cuban revolution’s discourse. Indeed, Asian 
and African twentieth century battles against colonialism increasingly joined Latin 
America’s nineteenth century struggle for independence as frames of reference. The 
Tricontinental conference and its publications resonated with expressions of solidarity 
with Vietnam and promises to emulate its example. Already, in 1964, Fidel Castro 
had labelled Colombia and Venezuela – both of which had revolutionary insurgencies 
at the time – as “the nucleus of a vast Vietnam” in Latin America. At the 
Tricontinental Conference, Cuba’s President, Osvaldo Dorticos, underscored 
revolutionaries’ “fundamental obligation to express solidarity with, and pledge the 
most resolute support for, the valiant people of Vietnam.”63  
In keeping with this idea, in April 1967, the Tricontinental published Che 
Guevara’s message to revolutionaries to create “two, three, many Vietnams” as a                                                         
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means of bringing imperialism to its knees; a message which reverberated loudly in 
the Southern Cone.64 “No se trata de desear éxitos al agredido”, Che insisted, 
bemoaning Latin Americans lackluster support for the Vietnamese from afar, “sino de 
correr su misma suerte; acompañarlo a la muerte o la victoria.” As Guevara insisted, 
the road ahead would be long and costly, but it would triumph as long as there were 
enough people committed to its success and ready to take up arms.  
Crucially, Che also argued that Latin America had a specific role to play in 
supporting Vietnam in this way. As he explained – vaguely, as others had before him  
– shared language (he considered Spanish and Portuguese to be close enough for 
mutual comprehension), customs, religion, “amo común”, and the same exploitation 
meant revolutions in the region would automatically have “dimensiones 
continentales”. On a global level, this continental revolution would then play a pivotal 
role in the battle against imperialism: “América, continente olvidado por las últimas 
luchas políticas de liberación”, he argued, “tendrá una tarea de mucho mayor relieve: 
la de la creación del segundo o tercer Vietnam o del segundo y tercer Vietnam del 
mundo.” 65 Equating Latin American revolutionary struggles with larger global anti-
colonial liberation movements gave them a broader, immediate global relevance. By 
evoking the need for the liberation of Latin America, which was obviously 
independent long before most of Asia and Africa, Che Guevara and his followers also 
spoke directly to movements across the globe they wanted to emulate and draw 
strength from.  
These ideas formed the basis of Che Guevara’s decision to establish the ELN 
in Bolivia. After his death, his survivors then explicitly tried to translate them into 
reality. Tellingly, “Volveremos a la montaña” mentioned Vietnam as many times (10) 
as Bolivia. As it stated, because Vietnamese people were fighting “por 
nosotros…nosotros debemos pelear por ellos.” And when it came to the definition of 
“nosotros”, the ELN switched between a nominal Bolivian label and a transnational, 
regional identity. Indeed, to elenos, “Bolivia” represented Latin America. In the same 
language Che had used, its revolutionary venture would have “dimensiones 
continentals”. The ELN’s stated purpose – its “mota única y final” – was the 
“liberación de América Latina” in keeping with “el sueño bolivariano y del Che de 
unir Latinoamérica política y geológicamente”. Rather than any reference to the 
Cuban – or Bolshevik – Revolution, the roots of this project were imagined as being 
nineteenth century wars of independence, with Che Guevara posthumously 
proclaimed the “nuevo Bolívar de América Latina”.66 As Inti would state in a 
message published in Bolivia in September 1969, this insurgency was the 
“sublevación de los ideales libertarios…la continuación de la lucha bolivariana.”67 
“Esta es ya la época de la revolución continental,” the ELN’s manifesto underlined, 
pointing to the Cubans, Peruvians, Argentinians and Bolivians that had died fighting 
with Che Guevara in Bolivia.68 Inti Peredo repeated this argument later in interview 
for Punto Final. “Hay quienes desean congelar dentro de las fronteras nacionales a los 
movimientos que luchan por la liberación continental”, he added, “Es absurdo. La                                                         
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lucha es de todos…La lucha contra el imperialismo es una sola.”69  
There were various reasons why Bolivia was chosen as the place to initiate 
this kind of regional Latin Americanist revolution. Like those who were trying to stop 
revolution in Latin America during the 1960s through reformist programmes and 
counterinsurgency efforts, ELN members assumed that Bolivia’s poverty would 
automatically trigger revolution. Bolivia’s central location in the middle of South 
America was also considered strategically important, offering supply lines from other 
countries and the possibility of extending a guerrilla insurgency outwards across its 
five borders. In the mid-1960s, it had become important not as the object of Cuba’s 
revolutionary operations but as a rear-guard – a “zona de tránsito”70 – for those 
destined for guerrilla operations in Peru and Argentina.71 However, once these had 
failed, it had become the focus of revolutionary planning itself, albeit with the aim of 
creating a “mother column” that would then span out to neighbouring countries.72  
Mainly, however, those who now signed up to a new revolutionary venture in 
Bolivia in 1968 did so because Che Guevara had chosen the country to make his 
ultimate sacrifice – the place he had selected to create the Latin American Vietnam he 
had called for. No one questioned whether his choice had been right. To the contrary, 
ironically, as a result of his death, it was sanctified, glorified and indisputable. Now, 
ELN recruits not only hoped to follow in Che’s footsteps but to resurrect him from 
Bolivian soil. In the words of a hymn sung by future ELN recruits, “Nosotros somos, 
Che comandante | aquel Viet Nam con que tú soñaste… aquella sangre que 
derramaste | como ave fénix resugirá.”73 Or as Elmo Catalán would explain to his 
family:  
 
Bolivia está en pleno corazón del cono sur, es el que más ha sentido la 
explotación y el hambre, y su pueblo tiene una tradición de lucha que lo 
convierte en uno de los más aguerridos del continente. Es también, por 
derecho propio y por la semilla que sembró el Che, el senario histórico natural 
e indiscutido…74 
 
Beyond this broad framework, the ELN’s definition of revolution and its ideological 
foundation are difficult to pin down. Except for the movement’s manifesto, no written 
ideological framework for the organisation was drawn up until early 1969, when a 
document called the “Ideario politico del Ejército de Liberación Nacional” – again, 
most probably written by Elmo Catalán – was distributed among recruits in Cuba.75 
To some extent, disagreements between diverse, heterogeneous members explain this. 
However, the lack of a coherent ideological framework also owed much to the 
preference for armed struggle over theory; the idea – popularised by the Cuban 
Revolution and Guevara – that actions spoke louder than words. “La revolución no se 
hace con declaraciones en conferencias”, Inti Peredo proclaimed in a message 
published early in September 1969, “La revolución se hace luchando, respondiendo a 
la violencia brutal del enemigo con la violencia revolucionaria.”76 Recruits carried                                                         
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books by Regis Debray and Guevara with them in training but few read even these 
works very closely. As Debray reflected in an interview for Punto Final after 
Guevara’s death, “lo importante del Ché no eran sus ideas, sino una manera de 
ponerlas en práctica, de vivirlas hasta el ultimo compromiso.”77 This message 
resonated among those who wanted to emulate Guevara and presumably accounts for 
the lack of in-depth theorizing or planning when it came to how a Latin Americanist 
Revolution would work in practice. As one ELN member remembered, “Algunos de 
nosotros blabuceábamos el marxismo o creíamos saber algo del marxismo, pero 
apenas habíamos tirado una leída y no entendíamos mucho. Intentábamos resumir 
todo el cuerpo ideológico en el accionar más que en las palabras.”78  
Tragically, Guevara’s experience – and the way it was reported – also led 
elenos to embrace the violent consequences of armed struggle rather than question 
them. Death was romanticised and Che was defined in the ELN’s manifesto as 
“romantico, visionario y heroico”. Those who had died with him in Bolivia were 
explicitly named, celebrated and accorded “honor y gloria”.79 In his homage to 
Guevara back in October 1967, Fidel Castro had celebrated the blood he had spilt on 
Bolivian soil: “¡Ese sangre se derramó por todos los explotados, por todos los 
oprimidos…!”80 As the head of Chile’s Prensa Latina office put it, in an article for 
Punto Final, Guevara’s death had proved he was “un revolucionario verdadero” – the 
implication being that if his followers wanted to acquire the same status they also had 
to embrace death.81 The Chilean magazine also published a poem dedicated to 
Guevara by the Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén, which circulated widely throughout 
Latin America after October 1967 and encouraged revolutionary hopefuls to follow 
Che to the grave: 
 
Espéranos. Partiremos contigo. Queremos  
morir para vivir como tú has muerto, 




Now, ELN recruits voluntarily pledged to uphold his ideals “hasta morir” in what 
they were informed would be a “lucha…sangriente y cruel”.83  For these 
revolutionaries whose cause went beyond Bolivia and encompassed Latin America as 
a whole, their motto would not be Cuba’s “patria o muerte”, but rather  “victoria o 
muerte”.84 Indeed, death as a means of furthering this particularly potent articulation 
of a Latin Americanist vision – a Bolivarian Vietnam – was held up something to 
aspire to. As one ELN recruit remembered “Éramos muy jóvenes y vivíamos una 
apasionante aventura, sin preocupaciones y embriagados por el romántico orgullo de 
ser los herederos del Che.”85 
 
Unravelling                                                          
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Almost as soon as the first ELN recruits arrived back in Bolivia after training in Cuba, 
the organisation’s project began to unravel. In July 1969, security services located and 
killed key members of the urban underground, rendering safe houses inoperative and 
seizing weapons, ammunition and supplies.  In September 1969, Inti Peredo was also 
killed. While his brother, Osvaldo “Chato” Peredo, assumed his place, this was only 
after a bitter leadership battle. Unlike Inti, he had never been part of Guevara’s 
original insurgency and therefore did not command the same respect or legitimacy. 
The political context in Bolivia had also changed when General René Barrientos was 
killed in a plane crash on 27 April 1969 and his successor – Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas 
– was then overthrown by the nationalist military leader Alfredo Ovando Candía on 
26 September 1969. When Ovando nationalised the US-owned Gulf Oil Company, 
eased repressive restrictions on trade unions, adopted an anti-imperialist discourse, re-
established relations with the Soviet Union and even suggested he might renew 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, this called into question the ELN’s purpose. Although 
some elenos left the organisation, the majority, whose primary focus was on Latin 
America, Vietnam and fulfilling Che Guevara’s legacy, stayed.  
The combined fragility of the ELN in Bolivia and the new political context 
nevertheless caused the Cubans to withdraw their support. Already, in early 1969, 
they had hesitated before facilitating the transfer of ELN recruits to Bolivia stationed 
in Cuba. Then, in late July or beginning of August, even before Inti’s death, they 
recalled the two Cubans – Benigno and Pombo – who were due return to Bolivia to 
fight under Inti’s command. Benigno, in Rome, on route to Chile for transit across the 
border was simply barred from onward travel by the Cuban embassy. Although the 
Cubans sent a final instalment of money to the ELN immediately after Inti’s death via 
a Chilean emissary, this spelt the end of significant Cuban involvement.86 
To understand the sudden withdrawal of Cuban support it is important to grasp 
the broader regional and global context in addition to the ELN’s desperate situation in 
Bolivia. In 1968, when Cuba had committed to a new Bolivian insurgency, rural focos 
had already failed or were under severe pressure across Latin America. Immediately 
prior to the deterioration of the ELN’s position in Bolivia in 1969, the Cubans had 
suffered severe defeats in Venezuela and Guatemala, where they had been supporting 
a guerrilla insurgency since the early 1960s. A string of rural guerrilla insurgencies 
had also been defeated by the military regime Brazil and an attempt to establish a 
guerrilla foco in Tucumán, Argentina, had failed in its initial phase.87 
These guerrilla defeats substantially weakened the Cubans’ position when it 
came to their relationship with the Soviet Union. Having disagreed on revolutionary 
strategy in Latin America throughout the 1960s, Cuban-Soviet relations deteriorated 
even further in 1967-8 as a result of Che Guevara’s foray into Bolivia. For the Soviet 
Union, Cuba’s position in Latin America was dangerous and provocative; being 
dragged into an open confrontation with the United States in Latin America by the 
Cubans had to be avoided. Cuba’s unorthodox economic planning, Castro’s decision 
to purge a pro-Soviet group and the Soviet decision to withhold previously promised 
oil supplies strained the relationship further. With their revolutionary gambles in 
Latin America having failed, no prospects of achieving a 10 million ton sugar harvest                                                         
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at home that Cuba’s leaders had proclaimed and the need for defensive support 
against the United States, Castro had no real alternative other than to pull away from 
the brink. In August 1968, he signalled his readiness to work with the Soviets when 
he did not condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the context of growing moves 
towards superpower détente within the context of the global Cold War and Soviet 
insistence on peaceful-coexistenc, the Cubans therefore decided to change strategy.88 
Primarily, Havana’s leaders reorieted Cuba’s relations with Latin America by 
downgrading support for guerrillas and the idea of a unified Latin Americanist 
revolution.89 In the second half of 1969 and early 1970, intelligence operations and 
international alignments were also restructured. The Viceministerio Technico at the 
Ministerio del Interior now split into two sections: the DGI (responsible for political 
intelligence) and the DGLN (responsible for solidarity work with Latin America’s 
left-wing parties and movements). Although many of its original personnel now went 
to the DGLN, headed by Manuel Piñeiro, the organisation’s priorities were to support 
nationalist military governments that had come to power in Panama and Peru in 1968. 
As one DGLN official remembered, “hubo un readjuste en el concepto de la 
solidaridad de la Revolución Cubana con América Latina.” Downgrading support for 
revolutionary insurgencies was strongly encouraged by the  Soviet bloc. In December 
1969, as if to confirm this, Cuban intelligence chiefs went on a three-month tour of 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For those who had spent the best part of a 
decade supporting guerrilla movements in Latin America it must have been jarring. 
As one Cuban intelligence official remembered, “Con respecto a la lucha de 
liberación nacional en América Latina, teníamos una valoración completamente 
diferente a la de todos ellos.” Another recalled that “había un gran rechazo al 
pensamiento del Che.”90  Even so, by the early 1970s, Havana’s leaders had distanced 
themselves from Guevara’s ideas. Even US intelligence analysts, famed for their fears 
of Cuban subversion in Latin America, had concluded Castro had moved toward 
“selectivity in his support” for revolutionary insurgencies and insistence on “self-
sufficiency” for armed revolutionary groups.91  
These changes in Cuba obviously had serious implications for the ELN in 
Bolivia, which had to sustain itself without Havana’s sponsorship. The Cubans never 
explained their withdrawal or provided solutions. The radio Beatriz was operating 
from Chile to communicate with the Cubans simply went quiet. Inti Peredo was 
meanwhile furious.92 In an interview conducted in June 1969, he appealed for help 
from journalists to help spread news of the organisation’s cause: “pidan solidaridad 
para la lucha del ELN que es la misma del Che y por lo tanto de toda América latina”, 
he asked, “Necesitamos recursos financieros. Las armas cuestan caras.”93  
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His appeal is revealing. Previously, the Cubans had absorbed all costs of the 
ELN, providing enough arms and bullets for extensive training and preparations 
inside Bolivia. The new phase of the ELN, which began after Guevara’s death, could 
simply not have taken off Cuba. As one of the Tropas Especiales who trained recruits 
in Cuba recalled, planning for a second guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia in 1968-9 was 
bigger, far more careful and institutionally supported than Che Guevara’s initial 
mission.94 Through its network of collaborators in Chile, the supply of funds, training 
and conceptual Latin Americanist framework, Cuba’s leaders had been the architects 
of the ELN’s venture.  
Now, the ELN continued, abandoned by the Cubans to its fate but retaining 
some of the legitimacy of being associated with Che Guevara’s internationalist 
project. To be self-sufficient, its members resorted to botched bank robberies in 
Valparaiso and Cochabamba in the latter half of 1969, although these led to yet more 
internal divisions and attention from security services.95 On the run with its forces 
depleted, the ELN nevertheless continued full-steam ahead. What is hard to 
understand is that in doing so it was able to recruit more volunteers in Bolivia and 
Chile. And, in this respect, again, Che Guevara’s death was important. It certainly 
continued to be romanticised and celebrated on the pages of Punto Final, which 
republished a serialised Cuban account of his final combat.96  
In particular, middle class Catholic students in Bolivia and Chile, influenced 
by shifts in religious theology throughout Latin America in the late-1960s now proved 
receptive to Che’s message. To be sure, Liberation Theology, as became known after 
1968, attracted a range of different religious groups, not all of who sanctioned armed 
struggle. To the far left, however, it provided a framework that allowed and inspired 
Catholics – such as the Chilean student and eleno, Julio Olivares Romero, or 
“Cristián” – to join revolutionary movements.97 The death of Camilo Torres, a 
Colombian priest who joined the country’s own ELN in 1966, was influential in this 
regard in mobilising Bolivian students known as “Camillistas”. Fusing theology and 
revolution in their reading of the world around them, Catholic students also came to 
regard Che Guevara as “Cristo en las montañas” and vowed to follow in his footsteps. 
Indeed, by 1969, the idea of Che as Christ and Christ’s revolutionary relevance was 
encouraged in far-left publications. A year after his death, for example, Punto Final 
published a verse written by the Spanish poet, León Felipe, but misleadingly 
attributed it to Che himself: 
 
Cristo, te amo, 
No porque bajaste de una estrella  
sino porque me revelaste que el hombre tiene sangre, 
lágrimas, 
congojas, 
llaves para abrir las puertas cerradas de la luz. 
Sí…tú nos enseñaste que el hombre es Dios,  
Un pobre Dios crucificado como tú.98                                                         
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For the ELN, in dire need of recruiting new members, these associations proved 
useful. Catholic student organisations and their members’ new enthusiasm for 
revolutionary action provided powerful mobilising tool. Logistically, at least one 
Jesuit priest in Cochabamba also provided refuge and a place for elenos to meet 
Christians in his convent.99  
 As Rodríguez Ostria notes, new ELN student recruits who joined the 
organisation were also highly influenced by scholars of Dependency Theory working 
in Chile at the time.100 Increasingly popular in Latin America at the end of the 1960s 
thanks to publications like André Gunder Frank’s Development of Underdevelopment, 
first published in the United States in 1966 and republished in Cuba’s Pensamiento 
Critico in August 1967, it offered Latin Americans a means of understanding the 
world in regional terms.101 As Marchesi argues, Gunder Frank’s conclusions were 
striking for their “ahistoricidad”, generalising Latin America’s experience over 
centuries and space.102  Yet his conclusions that the region as a whole suffered from 
underdevelopment due to its unequal relationship with global capitalism that 
exploited its resources served as the justification for revolutionary systemic change on 
a regional scale.103 For those inclined toward revolutionary change, it was “la base 
económica y social que complete las conclusions políticas de Regis Debray”, as one 
editor of the book argued.104 Writing to Luis Fernández Oña, who had introduced her 
to the ELN and who she was now romantically involved with, Beatriz Allende praised 
Gunder Frank’s “bueno y conocido” Development of Underdevelopment, suggesting 
he should read it if he had not already.105  
The Chileans heavily committed to the ELN since early 1968 mostly 
continued supporting the insurgency despite its weakenesses, working hard to recruit 
new members and incorporate them after Inti’s death. Certainly, with Cuban support 
withdrawn, these core Chilean elenos, such as Arnoldo Camú and Beatriz, continued 
playing a vital role in facilitating transit of supplies and people or acting as 
intermediaries between the Bolivians and the Tupamaros.106 To some extent, this 
probably had a lot to do with their loyalty to Elmo Catalán, now a leading figure in 
the ELN’s high command inside Bolivia. It also had a lot to do with momentum that 
had built up over the previous year and the structures that were in place throughout 
Chile to help support a Bolivian insurgency. Even so, some of the first wave of 
Chilean recruits who had joined the ELN just before and after Che died were 
disheartened. Fernando Gomez left the ELN in September 1969 just after Inti’s death 
in the midst of recriminations and leadership struggles. Writing to Oña in January 
1970, Beatriz also indicated her disillusionment: “Aquí estamos empezando esta año 
que tenía esperanzas que se iniciara bien, casi una necesidad de que así sea pero el 
comienzo no ha sido de lo mejor… la salud de mis parientes de Valdivia [her code for                                                                                                                                                               
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the ELN] es precaria … Tu imaginaras que esto me ha afectado muchísimo… me 
siento mas vieja y mas seria.” Beatriz also appears to have had a new urge to study 
ideology, writing asking Oña to send her “obras de LENIN…debo reconocer 
demasiada ignorancia…y debo superarlo ya que nunca me había propuesto estudiar a 
los clásicos Marxistas y ahora estoy haciéndolo.”107 
Preparations for the ELN’s Latin Americanist insurgency meanwhile stumbled 
ahead. What had begun a carefully planned, Cuban-orchestrated Latin American 
venture now took a more limited character. Of the original 60-70 recruits trained in 
Cuba at the end of 1968, only 20-25 remained by the time the insurgency began.108  
When an ELN recruit murdered Elmo Catalán and his new Bolivian girlfriend – a 
student leader in Cochabamba recruited to the ELN in 1969 and pregnant with 
Catalán’s child – just before the insurgency was launched, this provided another blow 
to the internationalist organisation. The murder itself was a sordid affair, fuelling 
conspiracy theories and yet more division within the ELN. While some tried to paint 
it as a CIA-operation, others explained it away as a love affair gone wrong and, 
although no one said it openly, there were also insinuations Chato Peredo orchestrated 
it to secure his leadership of the insurgency.109 Whatever the cause – unclear to this 
day – the discovery of the two bodies under a bridge on the outskirts of Cochabamba 
was a sorry end to Catalán’s dreams of following in Che’s footsteps. Pointless and 
remote, his death also stood diametrically opposed in scale to the continental 
revolutionary ideas that had brought him to Bolivia in the first place.  
It was at this point that two more Chileans, Carlos Gomez and Félix Vargás, 
also left Bolivia and returned to Chile.110 While 8 Chileans and six other non-
Bolivians still took part in the insurgency, its Latin Americanist character, cemented 
in the early months of 1968 when survivors of Che’s guerrilla column escaped 
Bolivia, diminished. Rather than spending six months training intensively in Cuba as 
original elenos had done, new student recruits also now had to make do with quick 
ad-hoc hiking and firing practice either in Chile or Bolivia. As Félix Huerta lamented 
decades later, “era muy difícil poder sacar la pata del acelerador.”111  
It was unsurprising, then, that the guerrilla insurgency ran into difficulties as 
soon as it started. Aspirations inherited from Che Guevara and Cuba’s promotion of 
Latin Americanist revolution had blinded elenos to their immediate context and 
environment. The guerrillas set off into an area none of them knew, many of them 
unequipped to withstand the rivers and the climate, and with only vague expectations 
of acquiring food and support from the local population. In their desperate efforts to 
be like Che, it seems that they also replicated many of his faults and mistakes. The 
guerrilla column even divided and lost half of its members by accident as Che 
Guevara’s had done three years earlier. Tirso Montiel, the Chilean eleno who had 
written to his family of fighting for “La gran Patria Latinoamericana” died when he 
went in search of bananas and chickens to feed members of the guerrilla column.  
When ambushed by the Bolivian army and wounded, he reportedly used a tree trunk 
to prop himself up and shout insults against imperialism.112 His death, on a farm in                                                         
107 Letter, Tati to Papote Querido, 10 January 1970, ABA. 
108 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 353. Debates exisit about how many originally trained in Cuba. 
Although Rodríguez Ostria refutes Benigno’s account, the latter counteed 2 Cubans, nearly 100 
Bolivians, 26 Chileans, 23 or 24 Argentinians, 1 Brazilian, 1 Peruvian, 1 Uruguayan, 1 Venezuelan, 1 
Guatemalan and 1 Honduran. D. Alarcón Ramírez, Memorias, 201. 
109 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 312–13, 326–36; off the record interview with ex-Eleno. 
110 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte., 333–37. 
111 F. Huerta and J. Chávez, El trabajo es vivir, 215–16, 220. 
112 G. Rodríguez Ostria, Teoponte, 419–20. 
the remote Bolivian altiplano, in many ways captured the inglorious, localised and 
isolated fate of a utopian vision on such a grand scale.  
Back in Santiago, Chilean elenos who made up the rear-guard never stopped 
supporting the insurgency but their involvement obviously decreased as events on the 
ground took over. Their last major operation was to help Teoponte survivors cross the 
border into Chile and seek asylum. Meanwhile, their attention had increasingly been 
diverted to other concerns, namely the candidacy and then presidency of Salvador 
Allende and the possibility that he could initiate a peaceful, democratic road to 
socialism. Never considered as a viable location for armed revolution and therefore 
disregarded by Chilean elenos in search of guerrilla warfare, Chile now came back 
into view. As  Luis Fernandez Oña told Arnoldo Camú when he talked about going to 
Bolivia to share the insurgent’s fate, Chile was now more important.113 Beatriz 
agreed. “Creo que Chilito se está poniendo interesante”, she had written to Oña in 
March 1970.114 Even so, the elenos did not give up their Cuban training that they had 
learnt for the Bolivian insurgency, either in security or intelligence. Instead, they now 
deployed it to help Allende. Coordinated by Beatriz, and led by Fernando Gomez, 
they formed the core of a new personal bodyguard in the latter phase of his 
presidential campaign.115 They also remained in contact with survivors from 
Teoponte and other regional armed revolutionary groups that sought sanctuary and 
support in Chile during the years Allende was in power. Their priority was now 
nevertheless to assist and support the revolutionary process in Chile. When the JCR 




The ELN’s experience after Che Guevara’s death was obviously only one example of 
armed revolution in Latin America. Its trajectory and conceptual framework is 
nevertheless interesting for anyone concerned with understanding the pull of Latin 
Americanism. Its direct link to Che Guevara made it a potent embodiment of the 
regional project he espoused. Although his death should have been a moment of 
reflection and pause, romanticised and celebrated, it mobilised young Latin 
Americans to take up arms.  
Two aspects of the ELN’s experience associated with this project are worth 
underling. The first relates to who signed up to it and why. As we have seen, the 
Chileans who joined the ELN were diverse and seemingly ad-hoc. Individual contacts 
and friendships mattered more than institutionalised party structures, and in the latter 
phase of the ELN, religious and intellectual causes fused with Che’s example to draw 
recruits to the organisation. Initially, however, the Cubans were the primary 
instigators of contacts. As far as we know, although Chilean elenos tended to be 
Socialists, their commitment was not approved or discussed by the party or its 
leadership. Instead, they were militants on the side-lines, drawn to armed revolution 
but unconvinced by its relevance for Chile. This had a lot to do with Chile’s particular 
circumstances. While the Cubans continued to court and support established left-wing 
parties in Chile – pinning their hopes and loyalty on Salvador Allende – the 
improvised nature of their collaborators in guerrilla operations was inevitable. It also 
related to the nature of the work involved, which was explicitly clandestine, relying                                                         
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on personal loyalty rather than institutions. In this respect, it is important to note that 
the Cubans kept different revolutionary operations separate from each other in the 
name of “compartimentalisation”.116 While this “compartmentalisation” was designed 
to protect revolutionary ventures, it also undercut the potential for broader 
transnational cooperation. Within a compartmentalised and clandestine world, the 
coordination of these individual volunteers required state-level sponsorship and 
resources. Internationalism, in other words, was highly dependent on some kind of 
centralised control – at least initially. Had the Cubans not been involved in 
establishing the Chilean ELN network, it is doubtful whether it would have existed or 
at least whether it would have played the significant role it did when it came to 
rescuing Inti Peredo and providing safe transit for elenos between Cuba and Bolivia. 
And, presumably, a Bolivarian-style victory on a continental regional scale would 
have subsumed Latin America under Cuba’s leadership. Yet there is no evidence to 
suggest the Cubans or elenos ever fleshed out details of what a Gran Patria would 
look like, who would be in charge or how it would work. 
The second point worth underlining is the power that a regional and global 
framework offered ELN recruits. By imagining their guerrilla insurgency as the 
continuation of Latin America’s struggle for independence, elenos made their 
operation historically relevant when it had few concrete links to Bolivia’s 
contemporary political and social context. By tying revolutionary movements in the 
Americas to Vietnam, the Cubans, Guevara and their followers also made them 
globally significant. These were impressive mobilisational frameworks. Even if a total 
200 or 300 participated in the ELN’s effort to launch a new insurgency in Bolivia 
between 1968 and 1970, they hardly made up the same fighting force that South 
Vietnam’s National Liberation Front, which numbered at least 46,000 by 1966.117 By 
equating what they were doing to nineteenth century independence battles and the 
Vietnamese struggle, however, ELN guerrillas – weak, divided and on the run inside 
Bolivia – could claim they had the strength and power to transform the world. The 
framework they were using was only vaguely conceptualised in speeches, repeated 
communiqués and manifestos. Yet, captivated by Che Guevara’s international 
standing and his ambitious dream of setting the world alight with “two, three, many 
Vietnams” – paradoxically vindicated as a result of his death – ELN recruits aspired 
to something that they never challenged, studied or questioned in detail. Instead, 
through imagined association with forces far bigger and historically significant than 
their own, they could reason that their personal sacrifices in the isolated, unpopulated 
mountains of Bolivia would be important – that in death they would attain Che’s 
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